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Helsinki 1993 Abstract 
The paper gives a brief description of the evolution of the Finnish banking crisis 
and  its handling. In  the first section, the salient features  of the Finnish banking 
system  are  described.  We  then  briefly  discuss  the  liberalization  process,  mac-
roeconomic  and  regulatory  policies,  and  the  subsequent  credit  boom  and  its 
development  into  a  recession  of unprecedented  depth.  Next,  we document  the 
impact on bank profitablity of the drastic changes in  macroeconomic conditions. 
The collapse and rescue of Skopbank are summarized. 
In  section  2  we describe  the  public  safety  net,  starting with  the  pre-crisis 
arrangements.  This  is  followed  by  an  exposition of the  new  me_asures  taken  in 
1992, with the emphasis on the establishment of the Government Guarantee Fund, 
its  organization, powers and  principles of operation. 
Section 3 gives an  account of the support measures taken by  the Goverment 
Guarantee Fund in the course of 1992 and  in early 1993. Section 4 describes the 
reform of the bank support arrangements in  the early months of 1993. 
Finally,  in  section 5,  we  discuss the  banks'  current economic environment 
and  their prospects in  the near future.  We also take  up  some of the major issues 
of principle relating to the rationalization of the banking sector. 
The paper includes references to recent articles and discussion papers dealing 
with important aspects of the current banking crisis. The list of references is by no 
means  exhaustive,  and  it  is  designed  mainly  to  help  foreign  readers  to  find 
supplementary material. Therefore only those papers in Finnish or Swedish which 
have to do directly with the current crisis are included. 
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6 1  Banks and the Finnish Economy 
1.1  Bank intermediation dominates 
Deposit banks are central to  the Finnish financial  system. The bulk of financial 
intermediation takes place through deposit banks. Thus, some 50 per cent of the 
financing needed by the public (the corporate and household sectors) is provided 
directly by deposit banks (Chart 1). In addition, banks have guaranteed about half 
of the  lending by  insurance companies.  Also,  with one exception, all  mortgage 
institutions  and  the  largest finance  companies  are  subsidiaries of deposit  bank 
groups. In all, about two-thirds of the credit risks associated with the borrowing 
by the public is carried by  the banks. The role of the banks  is  especially predo-
minant in  the case of households and small and medium-sized businesses. 
Chart 1.  Composition of the liabilities of the public, 
31  Dec. 1990* 
1 Banks 49.4 %. 
2 Public 5.2 %. 
3 Foreign sector 9.3 %. 
4  Public sector 10.1 %. 
S Other financial institutions 9.4 %. 
6 Insurance institutions 16.6 %. 
* Statistics Finland: Financial Market Statistics 1992:24. 
In  the  second  half of the  1980s,  securities  markets  developed  rapidly  and  the 
abolition of exchange controls  allowed  the  private  sector to  borrow  from  and 
invest abroad freely. This improved the availability of finance from sources other 
than  the  banks.  Particularly foreign  borrowing was widely  used,  starting in  the 
mid-1980s,  although more than  half of this  financing was  intermediated by  the 
7 banks. The increase in  the share of non-bank finance  may  partly reflect excep-
tionally favourable macroeconomic conditions, and might not have obtained quite 
such a high level in more normal times despite increased competitive pressures. 
The role of the banks in Finland is important not only as a source of finance 
but also  as  regards the control of companies. The Finnish banks are of the uni-
versal type and  are thus engaged in  various investment bank activities and  have 
significant stakes in non-financial companies. Therefore, banks are able (and quite 
often willing) to exercise strong influence over financial and strategic decisions in 
many enterprises. 
The  banking  system  comprises  five  major  bank  groups  and  a  number  of 
smaller  commercial  banks,  some  of  which  are  fully-owned  subsidiaries  or 
branches of foreign banks. Formally, there are a large number of  in~ividual banks, 
as  the  co-operative  banking  group  consists  of 310  individual  banks  and  the 
savings bank group of 41  savings banks  (end-1992 figures).  However,  in  many 
important respects, the co-operative banks operate as one entity, as do the savings 
banks.  Despite some specialization, all  major banking groups are active in  most 
geographical and  business areas.l 
1.2  Excess banking capacity 
The  banks'  service  network  in  Finland  is  large  and  technically  very  efficient. 
However, because of its size, it is also costly. 
Up to  the mid-1980s, direct price competition was  all  but impossible due to 
regulation. Competition took the indirect form of attracting low-cost deposits by 
building large branch networks and  investing heavily in  automated payment and 
other banking technologies. The result was that Finland  now  not only  has  more 
banking personnel and branches per capita than the neighbouring Nordic countries, 
but  also  one  of the  densest  and  most  advanced  networks  of automated  teller 
machines and point-of-sale terminals  in the world (Table 1). 
The extensive resource use is reflected in operating costs, which are high by 
international standards.  However,  banks'  total  income is  not exceptionally  high 
(Table 2).2 Therefore, the high operating costs result in weak underlying profita-
bility and  constitute evidence of substantial excess capacity in the industry. 
In recent years, banks' use of resources has started to decline. The number of 
employees had  been cut by some 20 per cent by the end of 1992 from  its peak in 
1989  (Chart  2).  A  similar  change  has  occurred  in  the  number  of branches. 
However, labour costs have not come down correspondingly. 
1  For a  fairly  recent  general  description  of the  Finnish  financial  system,  see  Bank  of Finland 
(1991).  A detailed account of the  banking system is  given by  the  Finnish Bankers' Association 
(1991). 
2  International  comparisons  are  obviously  problematic,  as  institutional  set-ups  and  economic 
environments vary  a  great deal  between countries.  For example,  in  bank-dominated  economies 
(Germany, Japan,  Finland) banks' balance sheets are bolstered by  low-income, low-risk interme-
diation, which in other countries may be taken care of by special housing finance institutions or by 
securities markets. Given the many similarities of the Nordic countries, comparisons between them 
are likely to  be  the most useful ones. 
8 Table 1.  Banking capaticity in the Nordic countries 
Per 10 000 inhabitants 
End of 1991 
Branches  Staff  ATM  EFTPOS 
Finland  6.2  (8.2)1  93.6  (104.4i  5.8  67.0 
Sverige  3.7  (5.9)1  55.0  (83.1/  2.5  9.7 
Norway  3.9  59.2  4.1  37.4 
Danmark  5.0  99.5  2.1  37.8 
1  Incl. post offices. 
2 Incl. post office personnel in customer service (5  420). 
3  rncl.  post office  personnel  in customer service  (18 415),  personnel  of the  postal  giro  system 
(3 840) and personnel in the housing finance institutions. 
Table 2.  Bank profitability in selected countries 
Per cent of balance sheet total, average 1985-1990* 
Country  Net interest  Non-interest  Total income  Operating  Net income 
income  income  expenses  before 
provisions 
Finland  1.98  1.98  3.97  3.19  0.78 
Denmark  2.74  1.14  3.89  2.24  1.65 
Norway  3.24  1.05  4.28  2.96  1.32 
Sweden  2.29  1.01  3.30  1.97  1.33 
USA  3.44  1.49  4.92  3.29  1.64 
Japan  1.13  0.34  1.47  0.92  0.55 
Germany  2.19  0.62  2.81  1.80  1.00 
France  2.38  0.48  2.81  1.88  0.93 
U.K.  3.17  1.92  5.09  3.33  1.75 
* The widest available aggregate for each country 
9 Chart 2.  Banking employment, number of personnel 
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1.3  Bad banking and bad policies in the 1980s 
1.3.1  Financialliberalization 
Deregulation of the financial markets started in the early 1980s (Chart 3). Already 
in  1980,  the  links  to  foreign  short-term  markets  were  greatly  strengthened  by 
allowing  the  banks  to  borrow  freely  in  foreign  money  markets  to  cover  the 
forward  currency  exposure  they  could  equally  freely  supply  to  commercial 
customers. The first foreign banks were established (as subsidiaries) in the Finnish 
market in 1983, resulting in more intensive competition in the market for foreign 
exchange and in the emerging money market. 
Interest rate deregulation got under way in 1983 with measures on the lending 
rate side. This gradual process was completed in 1986, when banks were allowed 
to  determine  freely  the  level  of interest  rates  on  new  loans.  Major  steps  to 
liberalize capital movements were taken in  1986 and 1987 by allowing long-term 
borrowing  without  restriction  for  selected  sectors  and  for  all  nonfinancial 
companies. 
A true money market was established by  exempting bank CDs from  the cash 
reserve requirement and agreeing on a code of conduct to  be applied  in  money 
10 market operations (to  ensure that  the  market operated  in  all  circumstances,  the 
Bank of Finland issued its own CDs as  needed). Furthermore, the Bank of Finland 
discontinued its practice of periodically issuing guidelines on credit policy to  the 
banks. Borrowing and  lending decisions were thus left to  the market participants 
alone  for  the  first  time  in  decades.  Although  the  process  of  liberalization 
continued until 1991, the most important decisions were taken in 1986 and 1987.3 
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1.3.2  Unconstrained stock adjustment starts 
The liberalization of the domestic credit market and foreign exchange transactions 
was not accompanied  by  other reforms that would  have significantly dampened 
the  expansionary  effects  of liberalization.  The  incentives  to  borrow  remained 
unchanged,  economic  policy  in  general  did  not  adequately  restrain  domestic 
demand  or  price  and  income  expectations,  and  banking  supervision  was  not 
tightened. 
Tax  incentives  to  borrow  were  not  changed  significantly  as  liberalization 
proceeded.  Because equity  capital  remained  heavily  taxed  relative  to  debt,  the 
latter  continued  to  be  the  cheapest  form  of  external  finance  to  companies. 
Furthermore,  households'  interest  expenses  could  be  deducted  from  taxable 
3  The  liberalization process up  to  1988 has  been described  and  analyzed by  Abrams  (1989).  A 
history  of exchange controls  is  provided by Lehto-Sinisalo  (1992). The  lifting of regulations on 
foreign exchange is also discussed by Nyberg (1992a). 
11 income  at  a  high  marginal  tax  rate,  making  borrowing  very  attractive  to 
households.  Finally,  tax  exemption  of interest  earnings  on  low-yielding  bank 
deposits constituted a subsidy to banks, boosting their capacity to  lend. 
Previously,  credit  rationing  had  prevented  the  attainment  of the  preferred 
portfolio compositions implied by  these borrowing incentives. With the lifting of 
the  regulations  such hindrances suddenly  no  longer existed.  Understandably,  a 
large-scale stock adjustment followed. Households as well as businesses started to 
borrow as  never before. In the peak year of 1988, for instance, bank lending grew 
by  no  less than 30 per cent (Chart 4).4 
Chart 4.  Bank lending to the corporate and houseJlold sectors* 
PER  CENT  CHANGE.----...---......-----,.---r---~---r----____:::JPER  CENT  CHANGE 
OVER  4  QUARTERS  OVER  4  QUARTERS 
_  Total lending 
_  Share of markka loans 
~  Share of bonds 
f"77;I  Share of foreign currency loans** 
*  Effect of credit losses eliminated  from  the  change  in outstanding 
loans. 
**  Depreciation of the  markka  taken  into  account by  reducing  the 
markka value of outstanding foreign currency loans by 12 per cent both 
in the 4th quarter of 1991 and 3rd quarter of 1992 
In  retrospect,  it  is  clear  that  neither  banks  nor  customers  took  adequate 
account  of the  changing  financial  environment.  Banks,  unused  to  recognizing, 
evaluating  and  controlling  risks  inherent  in  unregulated  markets,  continued  to 
operate on the basis of partly outdated principles. Competition for market shares 
was the dominant objective and led to a lowering in banks' credit standards. Insuf-
ficient attention was given to the value and quality of collateral, trust being put in 
the  historical  unlikelihood  of falling  asset values.  Credit risk  was  not  correctly 
4  For example,  Bruriila  and  Takala (1993)  document the  increase  in the  indebtedness of the 
private sector. 
12 priced.5  Likewise,  interest  rate risks  attracted  too  little  attention .. By the same 
token, borrowers appear to  have misjudged the risks associated with floating rate 
and foreign currency loans, being used to  administered prices.6 
At  the  same  time,  regulators  did  not  for  several  reasons  strengthen 
supervisory efforts. As in many other countries, deregulation was accompanied by 
strong public and political pressures stressing the blessings of unregulated, private 
choice.  Banking  regulation  focused  on  judicial  compliance  rather  than  risk 
evaluation. Furthermore, decisions by the supervisory authorities could frequently 
be  challenged  in  court,  which  probably  raised  the  threshhold  for  introducing 
stricter supervisory practices. 
Macroeconomic policies were not geared to  restraining the positive demand 
impulses  stemming  from  financial  liberalization.  In  part  this  w~s because  the 
significance of the impulses was not fully understood. In part the cyclical situation 
was  misjudged,  and  finally  policies  were  constrained  by  objectives  other  than 
short-term  demand  management.  Although  government  finances  indicate some 
fiscal restraint in 1988 as well  as  in  1989, no  major tightening took place. Rather, 
the  longer-term objective of reducing direct taxation was given priority. 
The Bank of Finland, for its  part, did not take timely action to restrain credit 
expansion  through  monetary  means,  apart  from  some  rather strong statements. 
Partly this  was  undoubtedly because the strength of the expansion was not fore-
seen. However, partly the lack of sufficient action was due to the overriding target 
of a fixed exchange rate, which made it difficult to raise money market rates. The 
implications of this constraint, on the other hand, were not fully understood more 
widely in  the economy. 
1.3.3  Positive shocks give a further boost 
Simultaneously with the new freedoms in  the credit market, national income was 
boosted  by  a significant  improvement  in  the  terms  of trade  between  1986 and 
1989; oil prices declined in 1986 while export prices kept on rising (Chart 5). The 
world-wide relaxation of macroeconomic policies in the wake of the stock market 
crash of 1987 accelerated the growth of export markets.  When  these  favourable 
shocks  hit,  the  economy already  had  behind  it  half a decade  of comparatively 
rapid and stable growth (Chart 6).  In  Finland, confidence was further boosted by 
the relative ease with which the oil shocks in the early 1980s had been overcome 
with the help of bilateral  trade with the Soviet Union.  The result was  a highly 
optimistic atmosphere where reasonable constraints on growth and welfare appear 
to  have been temporarily forgotten. 
5  Murto (1993) analyzes the  pricing of credit risk in the savings bank sector using micro data. 
6  The  exchange-rate  risks  associated  with  foreign  currency  loans  are,  of course,  borne  by  the 
borrowers. Banks' total currency exposures have throughout been strictly regulated by the Bank of 
Finland.  But  to  the  extent that changes  in  eXChange  rates  lead  to  credit  losses,  the  banks  also 
effectively carry part of the exchange-rate risk. 
13 Chart 5.  Terms of trade 
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1992 Demand not only for consumer goods but also for all real and financial assets 
increased substantially. Stock prices and real estate values soared. High asset va-
lues  in  turn  boosted wealth and  kept debt-asset ratios  deceptively low.  In part, 
new investments expanded the productive capacity of export industries. However, 
far more money was spent on investment in  the closed sectors of the economy: 
retail trade, recreation and housing (Chart 7). 
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The record-high rates of credit expansion and other relevant data led  the authori-
ties to tighten monetary policy in early 1989. The markka was permitted to appre-
ciate by  adjusting the fluctuation range for the currency index. At the same time, 
expansion  of  bank  lending  was  penalized  by  a  special  reserve  requirement 
imposed on the banks by  the Bank of Finland. Short-term market rates increased 
substantially towards the end of the year. 
The markka lending of most banks started  to  decelerate rapidly.  However, 
some banks in  the savings bank sector chose to  pay  the  new  penal  rates  rather 
than curtail their rapid credit expansion. Furthermore, as  markets were now free, 
borrowing  in  foreign  currencies  continued  to  increase  at  a  high  rate  (partly 
through bank intermediation).7  Higher markka rates  made such borrowing look 
7  The special  reserve  requirement penalized commercial lending less  than lending to  the  house-
holds. As, at the time, borrowing by households in foreign currency was still restricted while enter-
prises could borrow freely, foreign currency lending slowed less  than markka lending. 
15 cheap on the assumption of broadly unchanged exchange rates. Given the widely-
publicized policy of a fixed exchange rate pursued by the Bank of Finland and the 
successful defence of the markka in  1986, such expectations were understandable 
despite the recent revaluation. 
The monetary  tightening  of the  early  1989 was  too  late  and  too  small  to 
significantly affect overall demand conditions that year. Neither was there a clear 
shift in fiscal policy towards curbing domestic demand. Indirect taxes were raised 
and the growth of government spending reduced but household taxes were at the 
same time cut in  line with the long-term tax-policy goals of the Government. As 
a result, 1989 was the second consecutive year with real GDP growth of (slightly 
more than) 5 per cent; housing production alone rose by  20 per cent. 
As the unemployment rate was below 4 per cent, the economy was clearly in 
a state of overheating. This showed up  in an acceleration of labour costs, further 
eroding external  competitiveness,  which  had  already  been weakening for  some 
time (Chart 8). 
Chart 8. 
16 
The labour market 
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1.4.1  Adjustment begins 
Towards  the  end  of 1989,  the  tighter  monetary conditions  and  high  debt levels 
started to  undermine domestic demand. Servicing the  newly-raised debts took an 
increasing share of the cash flow  of many enterprises and  households (Chart 9). 
Particularly demand for real  estate was quickly affected. Asset values and  profits 
started  to  decline sharply (Chart  10).  Unemployment bottomed  out and  income 
prospects weakened.  At the same time, export performance deteriorated as market 
growth decelerated  and  market  shares  were  lost  in  response  to  weakened  price 
competitiveness.  In  1990, the growth of the  economy slowed  to  zero,  reflceting 
both capacity constraints and  weakening demand. 
1.4.2  Output hit by bad luck 
Following a gradual decline over several years, exports to the Soviet Union finally 
collapsed  in  1991.  Given  the  different  commodity  composition  of exports  to 
eastern and western markets and the weak price competitiveness of Finnish manu-
factures,  only  a  very  small  proportion  of the  lost  exports  could  be  directly 
replaced by sales to other markets. The increasingly severe payments problem of 
that country also implied that at least part of Finnish credits to  Russian importers 
could not be recovered on time. 
The loss of Soviet export markets brought about a negative demand shock of 
the order of 2.5 per cent of GDP,  including indirect effects. The resulting decline 
in  incomes  further  increased  the  problems  of those  with  relatively  high  debt-
service obligations. As the adjustment of domestic demand to  increased indebted-
ness continued with full force, total demand declined by  6.5 per cent in 1991. The 
unemployment rate reached  11  per cent by  the end of the year. 
17 Chart 9. 
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1.4.3  Financial risks materialize 
The rapid  decline  in  output was  accompanied  by  serious  balance of payments 
problems (Chart 11). This weakened confidence in the Finnish economy in general 
and in the fixed exchange rate in  particular. Expectations of a devaluation of the 
markka started to gain strength. In an attempt to bolster confidence in the existing 
exchange rate,  the markka  was  linked  to  the  ecu  in  June  1991.  That allowed 
nominal money market rates to  decline for a short while, but real rates of interest 
generally moved higher in 1991. Strong expectations of an imminent devaluation 
pushed  nominal  short-term  rates  substantially  higher  in  the  autumn,  and  in 
November the markka was devalued by 12.3 per cent (Chart 12). 
Both the high and continually rising interest rates and the devaluation reduced 
the public's capacity to service its debt. By mid-1991 the number of bankruptcies 
had  increased  to  a monthly average of some 600 from  around 200 a year before 
(Chart  13).  While  the  effect  of higher  rates  worked  through  gradually,  the 
depreciation of the markka abruptly raised the debt-service burden for firms in the 
domestic sector, with substantial borrowing in foreign currency. 
Combined with plummeting profits  and  declining household  incomes  these 
developments transformed  a steadily  increasing share of banks'  loan  portfolios 
into non-performing assets. Some 1.5  per cent of banks outstanding loans (about 
1 per cent of the balance sheet total) had  to  be booked  as  credit losses  in  1991. 
Given the weak  underlying profitability,  banks'  aggregate  profit before extraor-
dinary items became negative. 
19 Chart  11.  External balance, 12-month moving totals 
Bl1l.FIM r---~----'--~--r--~---'---"'Bl1l.FIM 
1 Trade account, Bill.  FIM 
2 Current account, Bill. FIM 

























I  ! 
, 




1  \  - ,  \ 
~  ,\  /\ 
I  \  1  I  1 
\  - 1  \ -' 
\  I  \ 
I:- 1 
~  /'/  \  I 
~\  ,  .. 
f- .... _- ,,'\/ 
t-
t- .', 
t- ......  . 
~ 
. 
.  . 
r.:..  .  .'  ........  . .  ./  f- •••.  .  . 
f- ... / .......... 
ti,l'! wluhJ.u Lulullllll lldld ,,"l d d " 
1987  1988  1989 
Bcu index 
3 month helibor rate 
Real lending rate* 















\  \  -
:  ..  ~  .... ,.\,  .. " ~.  -
10 
- 8 








* Average interst rate on outstanding markka loans minus annual CPI 
inflation. 
Applications for bankruptcy proceedings and 
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•  Applications for  bankruptcy proceedings, montly 
1993 
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11  New payment disturbances confirmed by the authorities. 
Source: Suomen asiakastieto Oy 
21 1.5  The first bank failure:  Skopbank 
1.5.1  Risky strategy backfires 
The first bank to get into serious difficulties was Skopbank, the commercial bank 
that acts as a central bank for the savings banks. Skopbank had pursued anaggres-
sive lending policy in the boom years. It had also acquired a majority holding in 
Tampella Oy, a multiproduct industrial group, presumably with the aim of making 
it  the industrial flagship of the savings bank group. Being financially weak after 
large-scale  investments,  however,  Tampella  encountered  severe  profitability 
problems, as soon as  the general economic climate took a turn for the worse. 
Skopbank had  been under the special and  increasingly strict ·surveillance of 
the Bank of Finland and  the Banking Supervision Office since autumn 1989. In 
October  1990,  the  authorities  drew  up  a  restructuring  programme  aimed  at 
managing the  bank's large risk exposures and strengthening its  capital base. The 
savings banks were required  to  provide FIM 1.8 billion in fresh capital for their 
central .bank as  a part of this rescue programme. 
1.5.2  Liquidity crisis prompts action 
By the end of summer 1991, it became increasingly evident that Skopbank could 
not  meet  the  goals  of the  restructuring  programme.  The authorities  drew  up  a 
contingency plan as  confidence in  Skopbank collapsed on 19 September and  the 
bank  was  faced  with  an  acute  shortage  of liquidity:  As  there  was  no  other 
authority  equipped  to  deal  with  this  type  of operation,  it  was  decided  that  the 
Bank of Finland must step in. The Bank of Finland then took control of Skopbank 
with immediate effect in order to retain confidence in the Finnish banking system. 
The restructuring of Skopbank got under way immediately by setting up three 
companies to  manage substantial portions of the assets of the bank. Scopulus Oy 
was created  to  own shares  in  Skopbank,  Solidium Oy  to  take over Skopbank's 
industrial holdings (including Tampella) and Sponda Oy to administer Skopbank's 
share  and  real  estate  holdings.  Strict  targets  were  set  for  reductions  in  the 
remaining part of Skopbank's balance sheet and  in  costs. The board of the bank 
was largely replaced. 
The Bank of Finland has  used a total of more than FIM 16 billion to finance 
the operation. Of that amount FIM 4.3 billion has been booked as  losses and about 
FIM 1 billion represents lost interest earnings. Some FIM 9.S  billion remains as 
loans  to  the  holding  companies,  part of which  may  be  lost  in  the  future.  The 
ownership of Skopbank was transferred to the newly-created Government Guaran-
tee Fund in June 1992 (see section 3 below).8 
8 Decisions on selling subtantial parts of the Tampella group have already been taken. In the early 
summer of 1992, stakes  in  the  metal  and  engineering division were  sold  to  foreign  buyers.  In 
March 1993, the paper division was sold to a Finnish competitor. At  the moment, Solidium owns 
88 per cent of Tampella. 
22 1.6  Banks' losses soar 
1.6.1  The economy continues to contract 
The rapid  decline  in  output  that  had  begun during  1989 continued  all  through 
1991 and 1992. Although exports had already started to recover in 1991 and grew 
by about 9 per cent in 1992, this was not enough to offset weak domestic demand. 
Real  GDP  still  fell  by  3.5  per  cent  in  1992  despite  increasing  industrial 
production. Business failures, primarily in the domestic sector, continued at a high 
rate,  reaching a high of 800 failures a month in  the autumn. 
At  the  same  time,  nominal  interest  rates  continued  to  rise.  This  partly 
reflected the  higher level of European interest rates.  More significant, however, 
was speculation fuelled  by  expectations of a further devaluation of the  markka, 
which kept  interest  rate differentials  wide.  By  early  September, the speculative 
pressure,  strengthened  by  the  general  turbulence  in  the  European  currency 
markets,  had  become so intense that the Bank of Finland  had  to  let the  markka 
float.  The markka depreciated initially by some 10 per cent.  By early 1993, the 
cumulative depreciation since September had reached 20 per cent (the exchange 
rate  index  had  risen  by  26  per  cent),  but  in  April  the  markka  appreciated 
markedly. Despite some initial fears, exchange rate developments appear to have 
influenced bankruptcies only marginally. 
As a result of subdued demand, inflation remained modest and  asset prices 
kept falling in 1992, despite the substantial currency depreciation. Consequently, 
real rates of interest continued to rise and collateral values to fall.9 
1.6.2  Problem assets and losses mount 
Not surprisingly,  the stock of banks' non-performing assets grew rapidly during 
1992 from  FIM 42 billion at  the  beginning of the  year to  no  less  than  FIM 77 
billion by  the end of the year.lO  Of this amount, some FIM 22 billion (4.8 per 
cent of total lending) was booked as credit losses. 
Reflecting the structure of lending during the boom, some 40 per cent of the 
non-performing assets  were related  to  construction,  real  estate and  retail  trade. 
Households accounted for 21  per cent of the total and foreign engagements for 14 
per cent.  Manufacturing accounted  for  less  than  8  per cent of problem  assets, 
reflecting the increased competitiveness and activity of that sector.ll 
9 For a discussion of the deflation process in Finland, see Honkapohja, Koskela and Paunio (1993). 
10 A loan is recorded as non-performing when the payment of interest or repayment of principal is 
in arrears by more than three months. Similarily, a bank guarantee is included in the stock of non-
performing assets, if the underlying liability arises. Systematic collection of data on non-performing 
loans did not start until towards the  end of 1991. Little is  thus  known about the development of 
problem assets in the early phases of the  crisis. 
11  An analysis of the structure of non-performing assets and credit losses is provided by  Pensala 
apd  Solttila  (1993).  Some  comparisons  of the  bookkeeping  practices  applied  in  a  number  of 
countries  are  also  given in the  paper.  Peisa and  Solttila  (1992)  analyze  the  backgrounds  of a 
sample of firms with payment difficulties. 
23 Worst hit was again the savings bank group, which accounted for about half 
of the  aggregate  loss.  As  noted  earlier,  the  savings  banks  had  aggressively 
expanded their  market share of lending during  the  boom· years.  This  naturally 
made for weaker-than-average loan quality, in certain instances strikingly so. In 
addition,  a significant part of the savings bank group's lending to  the domestic 
sectors was denominated in foreign currencies, thus making the clients vulnerable 
to the depreciation of the markka. 
The non-performing  loans  were largely  responsible  for  the  weakening of 
banks' net interest income. It  was, however, also squeezed by shifts of deposits 
from low-cost, tax-exempt accounts into higher-yielding taxable accounts induced 
inter alia by  the introduction of a low withholding tax on most interest earnings. 
Given the relatively low level of the Bank of Finland's base rate, to which almost 
half of all outstanding markka loans were linked, such shifts could not be 
compensated for by corresponding increases in lending rates. Consequently, 
banks' losses before extraordinary items increased by FIM 17 billion to  FIM 22 
billion (Table 3). 
Table 3.  The results of the Finnish deposit banks 
(groups consolidated), billions of FIM 
All deposit banks  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Income from  financial  7.5  8.1  9.8  13.2  14.0  16.5  15.2  11.9 
operations 
Other income  5.1  5.8  7.2  9.3  10.4  10.0  10.3  12.5 
Total income  12.6  13.9  17.0  22.5  24.4  26.5  25.5  24.4 
Expenses  8.1  9.3  10.7  14.1  16.5  17.9  18.7  19.3 
Credit and guarantee  0.2  0.3  0.7  1.1  1.8  2.5  7.6  22.0 
losses 
Operating profit  4.3  4.3  5.6  7.3  6.1  6.1  -0.8  -16.9 
Depreciation  1.5  1.6  1.8  2.5  2.9  3.7  4.0  4.8 
Profit before extra- 2.8  2.7  3.8  4.8  3.2  2.4  -4.8  -21.7 
ordinary items, appro-
priations and taxes 
Lending to  the  public  213.7  247.5  293.3  382.2  447.3  491.3  492.0  461.3 
Total assets  364.4  432.3  508.9  645.3  742.3  791.3  801.6  784.5 
1.6.3  Nordic countries: some parallels 
A  Nordic comparison reveals  that  the  onset of the  Finnish  banking  problems 
closely resemble that of Sweden. In both countries, the problems started to emerge 
on a major scale in 1991 and reached critical proportions in 1992. In Norway, the 
process commenced earlier and  banks' credit losses gradually crept up  between 
1987 and 1991, when there was a steep increase in losses. That remains the peak, 
as losses finally started to decline in 1992. In Denmark, losses have been  smaller, 
24 although they have increased over the past years, and Denmark cannot be counted 
as  a  banking crisis country in  the same way as  the other three Nordic countries 
(Chart 14).  . 
Chart 14.  Credit losses of deposit banks (parent companies) 
per cent of lending outstanding 
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In Norway, Sweden and Finland, the backgrounds of the crises are similar. 
Financial  markets  were  liberalized  fairly  rapidly,  but  economic or supervisory 
policies  were  not  tightened.  Lending  criteria  were  eased  as  banks  and  other 
financial institutions competed for market shares in lending and sought to expand 
into new business areas. A favourable economic climate then led  to  rapid  credit 
expansion, culminating in  a general overheating of the economy. 
In the case of Norway  and  Finland a single factor was important in  halting 
and  reversing  this  trend.  In  Norway,  the  shock was  provided  by  the  fall  in  oil 
prices while in  Finland  it  stemmed  largely  from  the  collapse of trade  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  Sweden,  the  more  gradual  effects  of accumulating  debt  and 
slowing of growth in  export markets appear to  have dominated, although eg the 
tax reform had  a strongly depressive impact on the housing market.1:? 
12 Koskenkyla (1992) and Koskenkyla and Pensala (1992) describe and discuss the evolution of the 
banking crises in the  three Nordic countries. Inter alia, Lindblom (1993), Koskenkyla (1993) and 
Vartiainen (1993) discuss more specifically the  Finnish case. 
25 2  The Safety Net 
2.1  The system prior to the crisis 
As in most western countries, bank instability was not considered a serious risk in 
Finland in the post-war decades. Fluctuations in aggregate economic activity were, 
given the active role of stabilization policy, generally thought to  be  too small to 
lead  to  massive losses of output and  general deflation. Furthermore,  the regula-
tions  introduced  in  the  1930s and  1940s - interest rate  regulations  and  capital 
controls - helped to make banking a very stable business with highly predictable 
interest margins. Consequently, the public safety net and supervision arrangements 
were geared to tackling rather limited problems. 
The  systemic  safeguards  consisted  of  the  risk  and  capital  regulations 
incorporated in the banking legislation, security funds, supervision and the duty of 
the central bank to  act as  a lender of last resort. 
Finnish  banking  legislation  has  not differed  essentially  from  that of other 
countries where there is universal banking. In particular, capital requirements have 
generally been as stringent as elsewhere. Thus, when the current capital adequacy 
regulations, based on risk-weighted assets and broadly in line with EC standards, 
were introduced at the beginning of 1991, most banks easily met the 8 per cent 
minimum standard. The most significant shortfall as regards the legal requirements 
probably  relates  to  the  regulation  of large  exposures,  which  has  allowed  for 
substantially larger risks than, for instance, present EC rules. 
Although  the current  legislation  has  been  in  force  for  only just over two 
years, amendments have already been passed by Parliament. The new legislation, 
which will come into force simultaneously with  the agreement on the European 
Economic Area, fully  harmonizes Finnish legislation with  the  EC directives. In 
terms of capital adequacy and  risk regulations, the new legislation implies some 
tightening of the capital requirements for  the local  banks and  a significant tigh-
tening of the regulations on large exposures. 
2.1.1  Security funds 
A compulsory security fund  system (deposit insurance) was introduced  in  1969. 
However, voluntary security funds  had  existed prior to  that. The savings banks 
and the cooperative banks had had their own security funds since 1924 and 1932, 
respectively.  A  fund  for commercial banks was  established in  1966.  Although 
based on law and supervised by the authorities, the funds are administered by the 
member banks. 
The banks'  security  funds  are  responsible  for  repaying  the  claims  of de-
positors  if payment cannot  be effected  out  of a  bank's own  funds  because of 
bankruptcy. The responsibility is  unlimited (no ceiling per depositor). In addition 
to  compensating depositors, the funds  may grant subsidies and  loans to  member 
banks. 
Until 1992, only the resources of the security funds of the cooperative and the 
savings banks were utilized, and only for the purpose of support loans and grants 
to  support individual  banks  or bank  mergers.  The system  thus  functioned  as  a 
26 vehicle whereby banks could collectively handle the problems of individual local 
banks.  In  this  it  was  aided  by  a system  of mutual  credit insurance  within  the 
savings and cooperative bank sectors, respectively. 
The resources accumulated were small in all security funds. In particular, the 
funds accumulated in the commercial banks' security fund were minimal in relati-
on to  potential compensation liabilities. Until now, the banks' contributions have 
been flat-rate ie independent of the estimated riskiness of banks' portfolios. 
2.1.2  Lender of last resort 
The  central  bank  has  traditionally  had  wide  responsibilities  in Finland.  The 
Regulations for  the  Bank of Finland stipulate that  "the function  of the Bank of 
Finland  is  to  maintain  a stable and  secure  monetary  system  and  to  assist  and 
facilitate the circulation of money in Finland". This clearly implies that the Bank 
of Finland  has  a  role  as  lender  of last  resort  as  well  as  a  responsibility  for 
upholding systemic stability in the financial markets. 
In  taking  control  of Skopbank,  the  Bank of Finland  acted  as  the  ultimate 
provider of liquidity. But in the Skopbank case the Bank of Finland also assumed 
responsibility  for  the  solvency of the bank in  the interest of systemic stability. 
Given  the  lack  of alternative  responsible  authorities  capable  of handling  the 
situation  at  the  time,  the  intervention  was  clearly  necessary.  Nevertheless,  the 
intervention did not, of course, fall wholly ·within the realm of traditional central 
bank operations. 
2.1.3  Bank supervision 
In  Finland,  prudential supervision of the  banks  is  in  the  hands  of the  Banking 
Supervision Office. The office is  subordinated to  the  Ministry of Finance but is, 
to a large extent, self-financed through the supervision contributions of the banks. 
In  the  supervision of the  large  number  of savings  and  cooperative  banks,  the 
Banking Supervision Office is  assisted by semi-official supervision bodies of the 
savings banks and cooperative banks, respectively. 
In recent years, the responsibilities of the Banking Supervision Office have 
been substantially enlarged  by  new  legislation,  covering inter alia  the securities 
markets.  With  the  exception  of  insurance  companies,  basically  all  financial 
institutions  are  superVised  by  the  Banking Supervision  Office.  Insurance com-
panies are the responsibility of the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. 
The Bank of Finland also  has some supervisory functions.  In part, they  are 
based on the Foreign Exchange Act, which assigns to the Bank of Finland the role 
of supervisor of the currency risks of financial institutions. In addition, the Bank 
of Finland has, of course, a supervisory interest of its own because of its  role as 
a lender to the banks. 
Traditionally, and in line with the aforementioned perception of the nature of 
risks  in  banking,  the  Banking Supervision Office has focused very much on the 
legal aspects of the supervisory functions. Relatively little work has been carried 
out on quantitative risk analysis or in-depth risk appraisal of individual  institu-
tions. Thus, when the banks increased their risk positions in  the newly liberalized 
27 markets, no clear warning or restraining action was  forthcoming from  the main 
supervisory authority. Similarly, the Bank of Finland failed to perceive at an early 
stage the full consequences of the credit boom. 
2.2  New elements in the safety net 
The  take-over  of Skopbank  by  the  Bank  of Finland  was  an  ad  hoc  measure. 
Subsequent  to  this  rescue  operation,  the  Government decided  to  approach  the 
looming bank problems on a more systematic basis. 
In  January  1992,  a  special  working  group  was  appointed  by  the  Prime 
Minister to  review  the banking situation.  In  its  report published- in  March,  the 
group suggested that two major steps be taken.13 The first was designed to  avoid 
a  domestic  credit  crunch  and  consisted  of a  general  capital  injection  into  the 
banking system. The second was to speed up the establishment of the Government 
Guarantee Fund,  which had  already  been  under preparation for  some time.  The 
Fund was given responsibility for designing and implementing support measures 
for banks with acute problems. 
In August 1992, the Government announced that the stability of the Finnish 
banking system would be secured under all circumstances. This first, exceptionally 
strong and comprehensive declaration expressed the basic principle of the Finnish 
banking safety net:  no systemic problem would  be allowed to  materialize. Later 
this commitment was elaborated by Parliament (see section 4.6). 
2.3  General capital injection 
In  March  1992,  the  Government  decided  to  provide  the  banks  with  a  capital 
injection totalling FIM 8 billion in order to support the supply of bank credit to 
customers. At the same time,  the  capital  infusion would,  of course,  help banks 
avoid emergency support. It was offered to  all  banks regardless of their solvency 
and  in  relation to  their risk-weighted assets.  Banks could  apply for  the  injection 
only twice, the last time being in December 1992. By that time virtually all  banks 
had  availed themselves of the facility,  receiving,  in  all,  FIM 7.9 billion  in  fresh 
capital. 
The instrument used for the capital injection was a preferred capital certifica-
te,  which  was  designed  for  inclusion  in  banks'  primary  (Tier  1)  capital.  In 
particular, the investment carries a non-cumulative return, and the capital value of 
the  investment  can  be  written  down  to  cover  losses.  The  certificates  can, 
furthermore, be converted into voting stock if 
interest remains unpaid for three years in succession or 
the bank's solvency ratio falls  below the legally required minimum. 
13 The report was published by the  Prime Minister's Office (1992). 
28 The certificates can be used to  cover losses after the bank's distributable equity 
capital and the reserve fund have been exhausted. 
The interest rate on the instrument was set slightly  above the  market rate. 
Furthermore, the rate gradually  increases  in  relation  to  the market rate so as  to 
create an incentive for the banks  to  repay. 
2.4  The Government Guarantee Fund 
The Government Guarantee Fund  ("Fundlt)  was  established  by  law on 30 April 
1992 to  help ensure the stability of the banking system and secure the claims of 
both domestic and foreign depositors. The Fund was authorized to use up to FIM 
20 billion for these purposes. The administrative costs of the Fund are covered by 
contributions from  the banks. 
Support  can  be  provided  both  directly  to  individual  banks  or  indirectly, 
through  the  security  funds  administered  by  the  different  banking  groups 
themselves. In practice, direct support has been the norm. Various techniques can 
be used  as  deemed necessary,  including aquisition of bank shares,  provision of 
other ty·pes of equity capital, loans, guarantees or other types of support. The Fund 
cannot, however, acquire all types of real or financial assets, thus being restricted 
from, for example, owning real estate or shares other than bank shares. 
Of course, the establishment of the Fund affected the responsibilities of other 
public  authorities.  In  particular,  it  was  no  longer  necessary  for  the  Bank  of 
Finland  to  guarantee the solvency of a  troubled  bank,  as  had  happened  in  the 
Skopbank case. The Bank of Finland was subsequently able to concentrate on the 
provision of liquidity to the banks. In addition to  its normal lending, the Bank of 
Finland has occasionally extended short-term bridging loans to  the Fund. 
2.4.1  Organization 
According to the original organizational structure, in force until mid-March 1993, 
decisions on support measures were taken by  a section of the board, comprising 
the representatives of the Banking Supervision Office, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Bank of Finland. The Section was thus the executive body of the Fund. Banks 
were represented by three members on the board proper, where decisions on such 
matters as  bank contributions and funding proposals were made. The supervisory 
board (with the same composition as  the Parliamentary supervisory board of the 
Bank  of Finland)  supervised  the  board  and  its  section  and  made  necessary 
proposals to  the Government. 
In  its  work,  the  Fund  has  made extensive use of the  staffS  of the  Bank of 
Finland and the Banking Supervision Office. However, the Fund remains a distinct 
legal entity, with no formal affiliation to any of the afore mentioned authorities. 
As will be described later (section 4.4), the organization of the Fund was changed 
in March 1993.  . 
29 2.4.2  Objectives and guidelines 
The Fund's supervisory board drafted general guidelines governing board activities 
in  October 1992. They are used primarily when interpreting and implementing the 
legal obligations placed on the board and should not therefore necessarily be seen 
as  exhaustive. 
According to the guidelines, systemic stability requires that confidence in the 
banking system is  maintained among domestic as  well  as  foreign depositors and 
investors.  One  important element of this  is  that  banks  conducting international 
business  fulfill  international  capital  adequacy  requirements.  Another,  though 
separate, element is  that bank deposits are safeguarded even though a bank may 
be unable to meet such obligations out of its own funds  or even with the help of 
the security fund  to which  it  belongs. 
Any support programme for a bank should meet a number of general require-
ments. Their exact interpretation was left to the body making the support decisions 
(ie the section in  the original organization) as  they will be part of any particular 
programme. The requirements are,  in  full, as follows: 
1.  Support is  transparent and public. 
2.  The attractiveness  and  public  funding  needs  of  the  programme  shall  be 
minimized. The economic responsibility of the owners of the bank receiving 
support should be realized as  widely as  possible. 
3.  The  terms  of the  programme  shall  support  the  efficiency  of the  banking 
system and contribute to necessary structural adjustments. 
4.  The distorting effects of the support programme on competition shall be mini-
mized. 
5.  Distortive interest rate competition is  not allowed. 
6.  Public monitoring of the activities of bank receiving support shall be ensured. 
In  particular,  the  granting of credit or writing off credit on  unusual  terms 
should be  avoided. 
7.  The  employment  terms  of the  bank's  directors  shall  be  reasonable  and 
possible inequities shall be removed. 
The exact terms of the support are,  nevertheless, decided separately in each case. 
Accordingly, a lively discussion is going on as  to how these guidelines should be 
applied  in  practical situations. Particularly the  extent to  which the responsibility 
of owners  should  be  realized  and  the  usefulness  of mergers  as  a  means  of 
rationalizing  the  banking sector are  very  much  at  the  centre of public debate. 
Nevertheless, the principles as  such seem to  have been generally accepted.14 
14  The principles of bank support are discussed eg by  Nyberg (1992b,  1993) and Aranko (1993). 
A banker's view is  provided eg by Vainio (1993). 
30 3  Support Programmes Implemented 
The Fund has supported the banking system in three cases so far. First, Skopbank 
was  acquired  from  the  Bank  of Finland  in  June  1992  for  FIM  1.5  billion. 
Secondly, also in June, it was decided to support the 41  savings banks who were 
later to merge to form the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF). This was done with an 
original  commitment of FIM  7.2  billion,  of which  FIM 5.5  billion  in  Tier  1 
capital. Thirdly, in November, the Fund supported the merger agreed on between 
STS-Bank and  KOP  by  conditionally  agreeing  to  take  over a  large  part of the 
former's bad  assets. 
3.1  Skopbank 
The acquisition  of Skopbank  by  the  Fund  from  the  Bank of Finland  did  not 
involve any  major change in  the  restructuring programme already  under way at 
that bank.  However, the holding companies managing the industrial holdings and 
real estate assets of Skopbank remained in the ownership of the Bank of Finland. 
The aquisition was purely technical, reflecting the new distribution of responsibili-
ties after the setting up of the Government Guarantee Fund. 
In  addition  to  the  original  aquisition  cost  of FIM  1.5  billion,  the  Fund 
provided  a further injection of capital of FIM 1 billion  in  December. A further 
FIM 0.5  billion was earmarked for  use during the second quarter of 1993. The 
total amount spent or earmarked by the Fund for Skopbank was thus FIM 3 billion 
by  the end of 1992. 
3.2  Savings Bank of Finland (SBF) 
A number of savings banks, many of them located  in the main metropolitan areas 
and  with  substantial  amounts  of  problem  assets,  showed  signs  of increasing 
distress during the first half of 1992. Since the savings bank system was built on 
the  principle  of mutual  financial  responsibility  for  each  other's  solvency,  the 
situation created potential problems for a number of other savings banks as well. 
Additionally, one of the major assets of a number of savings banks was stock in 
Skopbank,  the value of which after the Bank of Finland  rescue was  a matter of 
administrative convenience. 
To  resolve the situation without overextending the resources of the Fund, a 
total of 41  distressed savings banks were forced to merge during 1992 to form the 
SBF. The remaining savings banks were able  to  remain independent of both the 
Fund and the SBF. The merger, finalized in September, was made possible by the 
provision  of adequate  capital  support  by  the  Government  Guarantee  Fund,  on 
condition that a restructuring programme be implemented. 
The  Fund  initially  provided  the  emerging  SBF  with  a  capital  injection 
(including preferred capital certificates) of FIM 5.5  billion in June, together with 
a  guarantee  of  FIM  1.7  billion  for  the  issue  of  a  subordinated  loan.  The 
subordinated loan was eventually taken up  by  the Fund  itself up  to  an amount of 
31 FIM 1.4 billion while the. rest of the facility (FIM 0.3  billion) was converted into 
additional capital support. 
As  the  economic  situation  of the  SBF  proved  to  be  worse  than  initially· 
estimated, further capital support became necessary. A major reason for this was 
that the bank's auditors demanded that planned write-downs of real estate holdings 
had to  be speeded up.  In December, a further capital injection of FIM 4.7 billion 
was  therefore provided, of which almost FIM 1.2 was  in  the form  of share ac-
quisitions. The total  amount spent by  the Fund on supporting the SBF had  thus 
reached  almost  FIM  12  billion  by  the  end  of 1992.  In  April  1993,  the  SBF 
received a further FIM 1.1  billion. 
The ultimate goal of the SBF restructuring programme is that the bank should 
become profitable again by  the end  of 1996 through  eg  reductio~s in  operating 
costs  and  its  branch  network. The programme also  includes  other requirements 
dictated by  the general guidelines: 
a  Owners of the merging savings banks (primarily savings bank foundations) 
lost virtually all  their capital on the banks' balance sheets. The employment 
terms of directors were trimmed and may In future reflect the extent to which 
the· support programme is  fulfilled,  thus  creating incentives for  compliance 
and  efficiency.  . 
b  The bank undertook to convert itself into  a joint stock company as  soon as 
legally possible, the majority of voting stock (or convertible preferred capital 
certificates) to  be held  by  the  Government Guarantee Fund.  After  that,  the 
Fund will  be free  to  dispose of the stock in  a manner which bes serves the 
general interest. The conversion took place in December. 
c  Apart from  the capital infusions, the Fund did  not provide the SBF with any 
funding  at  special rates.  The Bank of Finland  has,  of course, extended  the 
same  rights  to  the  bank  as  to  other  major  banks  in  Finland  as  regards 
fulfilling the criteria relating to  eg solvency. 
d  The  Fund  appoints  one  member  of the  board  as  well  as  one  of SBF's 
auditors. As owner, the Fund also appoints  a sufficient number of members 
to  the supervisory board of the bank. The bank is  also, of course, obliged to 
report regularly and when so requested on  its  activities and on its economic 
and financial situation. 
3.3  STS-Bank 
In September 1992, STS-Bank asked the Government Guarantee Fund for support 
since its  assets posed a considerable risk to  the solvency of the bank. STS-Bank 
was  a relatively small commercial bank whose status had  recently been changed 
from that of a savings bank. Like many savings banks it was encountering serious 
profitability problems related  to  credit losses and  reductions  in  the value of real 
estate holdings. 
As the owners of STS-Bank were unable to provide additional capital and the 
bank  functioned  in  areas  where  excess  banking  capacity  existed,  it  appeared 
32 unviable as an independent entity. The Fund therefore encouraged negotiations on 
a  merger  between  STS-Bank  and  Kansallis-Osake-Pankki  (KOP),  a  major 
commercial bank. In November, STS-Bank announced that it was going to merge 
with KOP. In the same context, KOP bought the majority of STS-Bank shares at 
a price close to the going market rate, but substantially below their nominal value. 
The merger was  negotiated  in  very  close cooperation with  the  Government 
Guarantee Fund  and  under  its  auspices.  The Fund  assumed  responsibility  for  a 
substantial  part of the  problem  assets  of STS-Bank,  subject to  subsequent par-
liamentary  approval.  The bank's bad  assets  were  to  be transferred  for  eventual 
disposal to a separate asset management company ("bad bank"), in which the Fund 
was to  have a large majority holding while KOP  was  to  provide administrative 
expertise.  _ 
In the event (see below), Parliament did  not approve the creation of such a 
company, which meant that the provisional agreement could not  be finalized  as 
planned. The exact conditions of the merger therefore had to be renegotiated, the 
situation being complicated by  the fact that the  amount of problem assets of the 
STS-Bank turned  out to  be substantially  larger  than  originally foreseen  by  the 
Fund. 
On "8 April 1993, the Government Guarantee Fund agreed on an arrangement 
for managing STS-Bank's problem loans, which totalled  approximately FIM 3.4 
billion and contained potential losses of some FIM 2.5 billion. These loans are to 
remain on the books of STS-Bank while other assets will be transferred to  KOP. 
The Fund  is  responsible for  90 per  cent and  KOP  for  10 per cent  of the  loan. 
losses  and  STS-Bank management costs.  Because of the unexpected  increase in 
losses,  KOP  will, inter alia,  pay  FIM 75  million  to  the  Fund.  Finally,  the joint 
security  fund  of the  commercial  banks  and  Postipankki  Oy  will  transfer all  its 
assets,  totalling approximately  FIM 342 million,  to  the  Government  Guarantee 
Fund. 
STS-Bank will  continue  to  function  as  a commercial  bank  but  will  focus 
exclusively in its operations on the management of the stock of problem loans (in 
essence, becoming a "bad bank"). KOP will retain ownership of STS-Bank but the 
effective control  of the  bank will  be  transferred  to  the  Government  Guarantee 
Fund under a separate agreement. 
The aim  is  to  implement the arrangement in May 1993. In  this context, the 
name of the bank and  its  articles of association will be changed to correspond to 
the change in the bank's activities. 
3.4  Resources used 
In all,  the Fund  had  used  FIM 14.9 billion for various types of bank support by 
the  end  of 1992.  Together  with  the  FIM  7.9  billion  earlier  provided  by  the 
Government to  all  banks,  and  the loss of FIM 4.3  billion by  Bank of Finland in 
conjunction with the Skopbank operation, a total of some FIM 27 billion had been 
provided  to  the  banks  by  the authorities  by  the end  of 1992 in  the  form  of new 
capital  or booked  losses.  In  addition,  the  Bank  of Finland  had  some  FIM  9.5 
billion of outstanding loans due to  the Skopbank operation on its books, bringing 
the end-1992 sum of funds tied up in bank support to  almost FIM 37 billion. The 
decision on  the  problem assets of the STS-Bank and  further support to  the SBF 
33 Table 4.  Bank support in  Finland 1991-93/IV, FIM million 
Government  Bank of  Government Guarantee Fund  Total 
Finland 
Preferred  Loans  Sub-ordinated  Preferred  Share 
capital  loans  capital  capital 
ce rti fica tes  certificates 
1991  SKOP  39001  3900 
1992  SKOP  580  99002  1500  1000  12980 
Savings Banks  1 254  500  1400  7100  2900  13  154 
OKO  422  422 
Co-operative Banks  1 108  1 108 
Post Office Bank  903  903 
UBF  1 749  1 749 
KOP  1 726  1 726 
STS  170  170 
1993  SKOP  500  500 
STS3  -170  3200  3030 
SBF  950  150  1 100 
Total  7742  13 800  500  4600  9550  4550  40742 
1 Capital injection to  SKOP FIM 2000 million plus composition FIM 1900 million. 
2 Loans to  SKOP totalling FIM 9500 million for transferring risks  to  the Bank of Finland's holding companies Sponda and Scopulus (effect on capital adequacy FIM 760 million) 
plus capital injection in Sponda and Scopulus FIM 400 million. 
3 Provisional; in addition the Security Fund of the Commercial Banks recompenses the GGF with some FIM 340 million. raised the total to some FIM 40.5 billion (more than 8 per cent of GDP) in  April 
1993 (Table 4). 
Apart  from  incurred  and  potential  capital  losses,  the  investments  imply 
significant opportunity costs; for the Bank of Finland alone the estimated interest 
earnings foregone amounted to some FIM 1 billion by the end of 1992. 
Most of the support has  been  in  the  form  of investments counted  towards 
Tier 1 capital (preferred capital certificates, shares). Guarantees had not been used 
by April 1993. While only a small fraction of the Fund's support is in the form of 
ordinary loans, the Bank of Finland has significant amounts of loans outstanding 
on its  books. 
3.5  Reprivatization efforts 
As a consequence of the  need  to  provide  bank support  in  a fair  and  effective 
manner,  the  authorities  had  aquired  ownership  of two  banks  of moderate  size 
(Skopbank and  SBF)  by  the  end  of 1992.  Bank ownership  is,  of course,  only 
incidental to any support programme, and the authorities seek to return ownership 
to private hands as soon as  pOSSIble. Accordingly, a major part of Fund activity in 
1992 centered on negotiations aimed at selling off all or parts of these banks. 
Talks to this end had already been initiated while Skopbank was in the hands 
of the Bank of Finland  and  those with  the  Union  Bank of Finland  (UBF)  had 
reached quite an advanced stage. A deal, had it been struck, would have rendered 
possible  cost  reductions  and  a  substantial  pruning  of the  banks'  joint  branch 
network. However,  in October 1992, the negotiations between the Fund and  the 
UBF  broke  down  owing  to  differences  over  price,  risk-sharing  and  other 
considerations. More recently, exploratory talks have been under way concerning 
the possibility of merging both Skopbank and the SBF with KOP. 
Some  banks  have  proposed  in  public  that the  banks  in  government  hands 
should be divided up among the rest of the banking sector. This idea has not been 
taken  seriously  by  the  authorities  as  the  banks  have  not  come  up  with  any 
concrete proposals as to how this might be implemented. The debate did, however, 
lead to some leakage of deposits from the SBF. 
35 4  Expanding the Safety Net 
4.1  Problem bigger than expected 
The amount of funds  the Government Guarantee Fund  had  to  use to  support the 
savings bank group in 1992 exceeded the projections made in  the spring of 1992 
by a substantial margin so that all  but FIM 5 billion of the funds authorized had 
been used or earmarked by  the end of the year.  Moreover,  developments in  the 
economy were worse than  anticipated  as  deflationary  forces  were stronger and 
growth  in  export  markets  weaker  than  expected.  It was  therefore  considered 
prudent to  increase the resources at the Fund's disposal. 
Also, the administration of bank support proved inadequate. According to  its 
original charter, the Government Guarantee Fund had no full-time staff of its own. 
Staff was assigned from the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office 
to the extent needed. Furthermore, a very substantial amount of analytical work 
was done by staff not permanently assigned to  Fund duties. As the number and 
compleiity of bank problems increased it  became apparent that the Fund needed 
a stronger organization. Full-time staff would be necessary, even though staff from 
the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office continued to  assist the 
Fund. 
The original organization proved  problematic in  two other respects as  well. 
First, representatives of the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office 
could not simultaneously act as  owners of the troubled· banks and  perform  their 
supervisory duties without a conflict of interest. Furthermore,  the sheer scale of 
the  support operations  implied  that  the  funds  should  be  controlled  by  a  body 
politically accountable to  Parliament, ie by the Government. 
4.2  Comprehensive reform proposal 
To rectify these shortcomings, the Government introduced a bill in  Parliament in 
January 1993  providing for a comprehensive reform of the  existing Act on the 
Government Guarantee Fund. The bill  contained  three main elements.  First,  the 
authorization of the Fund to grant support was to  be raised from FIM 20 billion 
to FIM 50 billion. Second, the Fund was to  be subordinated to  the  Government 
instead of Parliament  and given permanent staff. Finally, the Fund was to set up 
and own shares in  asset management companies ("bad banks tl), into which prob-
lem assets of banks in distress could be hived off. 
Although there was a broad consensus in Parliament on the need to  increase 
resources earmarked for bank support and the administrative reform also received 
wide support,  the  bill  failed  to  obtain  the  required  5/6  majority.15  In fact,  the 
main parliamentary groups agreed on the contents of the banking package after the 
idea of asset management companies had been dropped. However, the opposition 
:5 According to the Finnish constitution, the transfer of budgetary authority away from Parliament 
must be  passed  in the same manner as  an amendment to  the  constitution.  Immediate  ('urgent') 
enactment of a constitutional amendment, in turn, requires a qualified majority of 5/6 of all votes. 
36 refused  to  support the  immediate enactment of the  proposed amendment, as  the 
Government was unwilling to  commit itself to  expansionary fiscal  policies being 
demanded by  the opposition. 
4.3  More resources in a supplementary budget 
After the rejection of the comprehensive bank support package, the  Government 
asked  Parliament  to  authorize  an  increase  of FIM  20  billion  in  the  amount 
available for bank support through a supplementary budget, which can be passed 
by  a simple majority. Of the total,  FIM 5 billion was earmarked for guarantees. 
The  amount  was  limited  to  FIM 20  billion  because  under- supplementary 
budget  procedure  no  more  funds  can  be  appropriated  than  can  reasonably  be 
expected to be used during the fiscal year. The actual need for funds in 1993 may, 
in  fact,  fall  short of FIM 20 billion, as  the authorization makes allowance for a 
number  of worst-case  assumptions  about  bank  performance  and  the  timing  of 
support actions. 
One important aspect of the new bill was that future support measures were 
to  be decided  upon  by  the Government, not  by  the Fund. In the budget bill,  the 
Government nevertheless committed itself to  apply the guidelines adopted by  the 
Fund's Supervisory Board in October 1992. The bill was passed on 2 February. 
4.4  Administrative reform 
In  February  1993,  the  Government  proposed  an  amendment  to  the  Act on  the 
Government Guarantee Fund that provided for  a reform of the administration of 
bank support much along the lines of the more comprehensive reform bill rejected 
in January. The amendment was approved on 23 February. Under the amendment, 
the number of board members has  been reduced to  five,  only one of whom is  a 
representative of a specified organization, the  Ministry of Finance. The Bank of 
Finland and the Banking Supervision Office are no longer formally represented on 
the  board.  The  links  to  the  latter  bodies  have,  however,  been  maintained  by 
appointing permanent advisers to  the board from both organizations. In addition, 
the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office will continue to assist the 
Fund. 
As  before,  the  board  will  be  appointed  by  the  Parliamentary supervisisory 
board, which also retains its other supervisory functions. A manager and assistant 
manager will  head a staff of some 20 persons. The new board was appointed  in 
mid-March 1993 (Chart 15). 
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4.5  Parliament reaffirms commitment to banks 
When passing the amendment to the Act on the Government Guarantee Fund, Par-
liament unanimously approved a resolution endorsing and reaffirming the commit-
ment of the Finnish authorities to safeguarding the stability of the banking system. 
The resolution reads as follows: 
"Parliament requires the state to guarantee that Finnish banks are able to meet 
their commitments on time under all circumstances. Whenever necessary, Parlia-
ment shall grant sufficient appropriations and  powers to  be used  by  the Govern-
ment for meeting such commitments ". 
The  resolution  is  more  explicit  than  the  Government's  declaration  of 6 
August  1992.  It  stresses  that  the  entire  political  system  stands  behind  the 
commitments  made  by  the  Finnish  banks.  It  further  asserts  that,  even  though 
Parliament wishes  to  exercise control  over the  use  of public funds  through  the 
normal budgetary procedure, it undertakes to grant all funds that might be needed 
to  guarantee that banks can fulfil  their commitments. The resolution  is  without 
parallel in  Finnish parliamentary history. 
38 5  Outlook16 
5.1  Macroeconomic situation 
5.1.1  Exports grow but domestic sectors still weak 
Banks' prospects for 1993 and 1994 depend crucially on the general macroecomic 
environment  and  in  particular  on  interest  rates.  The  current  macroeconomic 
situation continues to be characterized by  highly disparate developments. Activity 
in many key domestic sectors remains severely depressed. That is particularly the 
case for construction, real  estate and  retail  trade businesses. On jhe other hand, 
manufacturing  output  increased  rapidly  in  1992  led  by  a  strong  rebound  of 
exports.  Although output data indicate some stabilization, a clear turnaround  in 
total output is not evident yet. 
5.1.2  Interest rates down, share prices up 
Interest rates  have declined  considerably  following  the  floating  of the  markka. 
Initially, this  was due to  reduced  turbulence on the European currency markets, 
but  domestic  developments  helped,  too.  On  14  October,  the  Government 
announced a new fiscal package designed, inter alia, to  reduce borrowing needs. 
Furthermore, the Bank of Finland cut its the base rate twice, in all by 2 percentage 
points.  Consequently, Finnish short-term market rates  had fallen  to  below 9 per 
cent by  mid-April from over 16 per cent at their peak in September. 
Bond  yields  have  also  come  down  substantially;  the  yield  on  5-year 
government bonds had  declined  to  below 9.5  per cent by  mid-April 1993  from 
over 13  per cent in  September 1992.  This suggests that markets do not expect 
there to be an acceleration of inflation though the fact that long interest rates were 
high  relative  to  those  abroad  indicates  some uncertainty.  As  noted  above,  the 
exchange  rate  weakened  at  the  same  time.  The  downward  slide  nevertheless 
levelled off, in March, and  a significant appreciation took place in April. 
The  stock  market  has  reacted  favourably  to  the  developments  since 
September.  By April,  share prices  have  risen  by  almost  70  per cent from  their 
trough in September, although the general index is still only at about half the level 
of the  high  reached  in  1989.  Foreign  interest  in  acquiring  Finnish  shares  also 
seems  to  have increased,  as  a result of the  low  value of the  markka and  strong 
competitiveness in  the industrial sector. 
5.1.3  Growth remains slow, external balance improves 
Growth in  Finland's main export markets is expected to  remain weak in  the near 
future. Therefore, it will not be possible to exploit in full  the vast improvement in 
16 The outlook for the economy as  a whole as  well as for the banking sector in particular reflects 
the situation in mid-April 1993, and may  rapidly become outdated, as new information becomes 
available. 
39 the  price  competItIveness  brought  about  by  the  depreciation  of the  markka, 
stagnant labour costs and rapid productivity growth. As domestic demand is likely 
to  decline further  in  1993,  output  is  projected  to  pick up  only  slowly.  Despite 
some  growth  in  the  course  of 1993,  the  average  growth  rate  for  the  year  is 
projected to  be close to  zero. 
Inflation  will remain slow  because of excess capacity,  notwithstanding the 
contribution of higher import prices following the depreciation of the markka after 
it was allowed to float. 
With domestic demand shrinking, the external balance is  improving rapidly. 
In 1992, the trade surplus more than doubled to FIM 12.5 billion. The current ac-
count deficit, which was still almost FIM 23 billion last year, is be expected to di-
minish markedly in  1993 and  to turn into a surplus in the course 9f 1994. 
5.2  Near-term prospects for the banking sector 
With  no  overall  growth  in the  economy,  declining  domestic  demand  and  the 
heavier. debt-service burden of the domestic-sector firms  with  foreign  currency 
loans,  the  fall  in  interest rates  that has occurred so  far  will not  be sufficient to 
help banks' profitability very much in 1993. Problem loans and  credit losses will 
remain substantial and net interest income will therefore continue to be squeezed. 
Consequently, banks will post significant losses in  1993 as well. 
In 1994, the banks' situation should improve markedly. A substantial fraction 
of bad loans should have been written off by  then, and net interest income should 
have started  to  recover as  a result of lower money  market rates and  (probably) 
higher  margins.  In addition,  the  rationalization  measures  under  way  will  make 
themselves felt in lower operating costs by  1994. 
However, the degree of improvement will depend very much on the 
macroenomic  climate  in  the  near  term.  A  faster-than-expected  recovery  in  the 
main  export  markets  could  significantly  boost  overall  activity  in  Finland,  and 
thereby  enhance the  debt-servicing capacity of banks' customers.  On  the other 
hand, investment activity could be held back by or a prolonged slowdown abroad 
or lack of finance.  This would  not only postpone  the  recovery  but also  further 
weaken banks' profitability Y 
Although the weak demand for credit has probably so far  prevented a "credit 
crunch"  from  constraining  investment  to  any  marked  extent,  credit  availability 
may become a significant factor when the demand for credit starts to increase. The 
freer  provision of financial  services  across  borders  brought  about  by  the  EEA 
agreement and the development of the domestic capital markets should, neverthe-
less, help solid borrowers to find alternatives to  borrowing from domestic banks. 
17  The nature of the potential financing problems is discussed eg by Vihriiili:i.  (1992). Solttila and 
Vihrii:i.li:i. (1992) provict'e some evidence of the link between bank capital and credit supply. Brunila 
(1992) analyzes the debt problems in various production sectors. 
40 5.3  Structural  issues 
The present problems should encourage  banks  to  speed  up  their rationalization 
efforts. Although the banks have already slashed the number of employees and the 
number of branches  is  also  on  the  decline,  more needs  to  be  done.  While it  is 
impossible to  determine precisely the size of a viable banking system in terms of 
the numbers of personnel and  branches, a comparison with some other countries 
suggests  that Finland  could  cope with about one-third fewer  banking resources 
than  in  1991. 
However, it  is  not entirely clear how this streamlining should and could be 
carried out. Clearly, given the overriding importance of maintaining the stability 
of the  banking system,  a laissez faire  policy of letting  the  weakest banks  exit 
through bankruptcy is precluded. The costs of bankruptcy are further raised by the 
lack of any  upper  limit on the size of insured domestic and  foreign  deposits  in 
Finland.  The  undertaking  made  by  the  Finnish  state  to  guarantee  that  all  the 
banks' commitments will be met implies  that only orderly  restructurings can be 
accepted. 
But even  then,  a  large  number of options  exist.  One  is  simply  to  cut the 
number of branches and  personnel without changing the number of independent 
banks. This might be difficult to do sufficiently quickly. Alternatively, an unviable 
bank could  be  merged  with  a competitor or wound  up  by  selling its  assets  to 
several  banks  and  even non-banks.  However,  studies on economies of scale  in 
banking do  not suggest  that  this  would  necessarily  result  in  the  most efficient 
banking system. 
Furthermore,  the  disappearance of major  banks  could  significantly  reduce 
competition either nationally  or locally  or both.  Increased  market power would 
most likely show up in higher margins, and in the longer run in  lesser efficiency. 
Competition from abroad and from other financial institutions could mitigate these 
effect,  however. 
Of course,  the  authorities  have  the  power  to  decide  on  the  fate  of the 
institutions that have come to depend on the support of the Government Guarantee 
Fund.  But other banks need to  be persuaded  to  agree on the restructuring plans 
involving  them.  This  has  proved  to  be  a  matter  of some  importance  in  the 
practical work of the authorities, as reaching a solution that satisfies all the parties 
concerned is  difficult and time-consuming. 
These considerations have led to the decision not to rule out any restructuring 
alternative  a priori. Thus,  in  addition  to  the  aforementioned  options,  selling an 
institution dependent on support to  a foreign buyer or keeping it in the hands of 
the Government for as long as  it takes to effect a satisfactory privatization remain 
viable options.  IS 
18 The management of the banking crisis and characteristics of the  post-crisis banking system are 
discussed in a series of articles in PTI-Katsaus 4/1992. 
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